By Eng. Abdi Ali Barkad (Somaliland)

The October 10, 2024 – April 2025, trilateral summit between Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia represents a significant turning point in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. While publicly framed as a platform for regional cooperation, the meeting effectively formalized a strategic alignment designed to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing regional assertiveness, particularly following Addis Ababa’s controversial January 2024 port and naval access agreement with Somaliland.

This emerging alignment reflects overlapping national security concerns rooted in history, geography, and power politics. At its core lies a shared anxiety over Ethiopia’s renewed ambition to gain direct access to the Red Sea and expand its naval and economic footprint, an ambition that neighboring states increasingly view as destabilizing.

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Successive Ethiopian governments have portrayed access to the sea as a strategic necessity, but under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed this objective has taken on new urgency and visibility. The Somaliland port deal granting Ethiopia long-term access and the possibility of a naval presence has therefore altered regional calculations.

For Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, Ethiopia’s moves are not merely commercial or logistical. They are perceived as part of a broader attempt by Addis Ababa to redefine the balance of power in the Horn of Africa, with long-term implications for sovereignty, security, and regional influence.

For Egypt, the overriding concern remains the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Nile River is Egypt’s primary source of freshwater, and Cairo views Ethiopia’s unilateral filling and operation of the dam as a potential existential threat. Despite more than a decade of negotiations, no binding agreement has been reached on water-sharing or dispute-resolution mechanisms.

In this context, Egypt’s decision to deepen regional alliances reflects growing frustration with diplomacy alone. Cairo increasingly sees collective pressure as necessary to compel Ethiopia to adopt a more accommodating position on Nile waters.

Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions add another layer of concern. Egypt’s economic and strategic standing is closely tied to the Suez Canal, which generated approximately $8.7 billion in revenue in 2022–2023. Any new maritime competitor or regional naval realignment in the Red Sea threatens to dilute Egypt’s leverage, especially at a time when canal traffic has already declined due to Houthi attacks near Bab al-Mandab.

Eritrea’s participation in the alliance is shaped by both historical grievance and strategic calculation. Relations with Ethiopia have been fraught since the 1950s, culminating in a devastating border war between 1998 and 2000. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2018, mistrust persists.

By aligning with Egypt and Somalia, Eritrea seeks to reinforce its security position, enhance its diplomatic relevance, and assert itself as a key stakeholder in Red Sea affairs. Partnership with Egypt provides access to a powerful regional actor with extensive military and intelligence capabilities.

Somalia’s involvement adds a crucial political dimension to the alliance. Historically, Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia has been marked by rivalry, territorial disputes, and proxy conflicts. In recent years, Mogadishu attempted to stabilize ties with Addis Ababa, recognizing Ethiopia’s role in regional security initiatives.

That fragile rapprochement was effectively undone by the Ethiopia–Somaliland port agreement. For Somalia, the deal represents a direct challenge to its sovereignty claims over Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991 and recently recognized by Isreal government and other friends are on the way.

Faced with what it sees as an erosion of territorial integrity, Mogadishu has turned to Egypt and Eritrea as strategic counterweights. The alliance offers Somalia tangible benefits: diplomatic support, military training, and a stronger platform to internationalize its objections to any future Somaliland agreement.

This shift was reinforced by the Egypt–Somalia security and military cooperation agreements, signed after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s visit to Cairo in August 2024. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi publicly affirmed Egypt’s commitment to Somalia’s territorial unity, signaling Cairo’s willingness to translate political alignment into concrete support.

One of the most consequential outcomes of the October summit was the establishment of a trilateral joint committee composed of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia.

In the short term, the alliance aims to firstly oppose the Ethiopia–Somaliland port deal through diplomatic channels. Secondly Strengthen Egypt’s negotiating position on the GERD and lastly Support Somalia’s security sector rebuilding efforts.

The emergence of the Egypt–Eritrea–Somalia alignment underscores a broader transformation in regional politics. As Ethiopia continues to assert itself as a major regional power, neighboring states are no longer relying solely on bilateral diplomacy.

Whether this evolving dynamic leads to greater stability or heightened confrontation will depend largely on Ethiopia’s response. What is clear, however, is that the Horn of Africa has entered a new geopolitical phase, defined by alliance-building, maritime competition, and strategic power balancing.

For policymakers and observers alike, the October 2024 summit should be understood not as an isolated diplomatic event, but as a signal of deeper realignment that will shape the region’s security and politics for years to come.